send chainlink from coinbase to binance chain link midi ring chainlink white logo Part 3 of 5 Chainlink LINK Audio White Paper Decentralized Oracle of Trusted Data
medium term strategy off chain aggregation incontract aggregation has a key disadvantage cost it incurs the cost of transmitting and processing on chain o open parentheses lowercase n close parentheses oracle messages open parentheses commits and reveals for a to the base of one a to the base of two dot dot dot a to the base of n close parentheses in permissioned blockchains this overhead may be acceptable in permissionless blockchains with unchained transaction fees such as ethereum if lowercase n is large the cost can be prohibitive a more cost effective approach is to aggregate oracle responses off chain and transmit a single message to chain link-sc a we propose deployment of this approach called off chain aggregation in the medium to long term the problem of achieving a consensus value a in the face of potentially faulty nodes is much like the problem of consensus that underpins blockchains themselves given a predetermined set of oracles one might consider using a classical byzantine fault tolerance bft consensus algorithm to compute a classical bft protocols however aim to ensure that the end of a protocol invocation all on all honest nodes store the same value eg in a blockchain that all nodes store the same fresh block in our oracle setting the goal is slightly different we want to ensure that chain link dash sc and then user-sc obtains aggregate answer a equals agg open parentheses a to the base of 1 a to the base of 2 dot dot dot a to the base of n close parentheses without participating in the consensus protocol and without needing to receive answers from multiple oracles the problem of free loading moreover still needs to be addressed the chain link system proposes the use of a simple protocol involving threshold signatures such signatures can be realized using any of a number of signature schemes but are especially simple to implement using schnorr signatures in this approach oracles have a collective public key pk and a corresponding private key sk that is shared among o to the base of one o to the base of two dot dot dot o to the base of n in a open parenthesis a lower case t comma lower case n close parenthesis threshold manner such a sharing means that every node o to the base of i has a distinct private slash public key pair open parentheses s k to the base of i comma p k to the base of i close parentheses o to the base of i can generate a partial signature delta to the base of i equals sig to the base of s k to the base of i open square brackets capital a to the base of i close square brackets that can be verified with respect to p k to the base of i the key feature of this setup is that partial signatures on the same value capital a can be aggregated across any set of lowercase t oracles to yield a single valid collective signature sum equals sig to the base of s k open square brackets capital a close square brackets on an answer uppercase a no set of lowercase t minus 1 oracles however can produce a valid signature on any value the single signature sum thus implicitly embodies the partial signatures of at least lowercase t oracles threshold signatures can be realized naively by letting some consist explicitly of a set of lowercase t valid independent signatures from individual nodes threshold signatures have similar security properties to this naive approach but they provide a significant on-chain performance improvement they reduce the size and cost of verifying some by a factor of lowercase t and there is a visual sort of flow chart here see the white paper itself but its got o to the base of one and to the base of two to the base of three four five all in separate uh like shapes around a sig to the base of sk open square bracket msg close square bracket and theres arrows pointing from a few of those os over to that sig with this setup it would seem that oracles can just generate and broadcast partial signatures until lower case t such partial signatures enable the computation of some again though the problem of free loading arises we must therefore ensure that oracles genuinely obtained data from their designated sources rather than cheating and copying a to the base of i from another oracle our solution involves a financial mechanism an entity provider realizable as a smart contract rewards only oracles that have sourced original data for their partial signatures in a distributed setting determining which oracles qualify for payment turns out to be tricky oracles may intercommunicate off-chain and we no longer have a single authoritative entity chain link dash sc receiving responses and are therefore unable to identify eligible payees directly among participating oracles consequently provider must obtain evidence of misbehavior from the oracles themselves some of which may be untrustworthy we propose the use of consensus-like mechanisms in our solution for chain link to ensure that provider does not pay free loading oracles the off chain aggregation system we propose for chain link with accompanying security proof sketches may be found in appendix a it makes use of a distributed protocol based on threshold signatures that provides resistance to free loading by lowercase f less than lowercase n over 3 oracles we believe resistance to free loading is an interesting new technical problem section 5 chain link security services thanks to the protocols we have just described in the previous section chain link proposes to ensure availability and correctness in the face of up to lowercase f faulty oracles additionally trusted hardware as discussed in section 6 is being actively considered as a secure approach towards protecting against corrupted oracles providing incorrect responses trusted hardware however may not provide definitive protection for three reasons first it will not be deployed in initial versions of the chain link network second some users may not trust trusted hardware see appendix b for a discussion finally trusted hardware cannot protect against no downtime only against node misbehavior users will therefore wish to ensure that they can choose the most reliable oracles and minimize the probability of user-sc relying on greater than lowercase f faulty oracles to this end we propose the use of four keys security services a validation system a reputation system a certification service and a contract upgrade service all of these services may initially be run by one company or group interested in launching the chain link network but are designed to operate strictly accordingly to chain links philosophy of decentralized design chain links proposed security services cannot block oracle node participation or alter oracle responses the first three services only provide ratings or guidance to users while the contract upgrade service is entirely optional for users additionally these services are designed to support independent providers whose participation should be encouraged so that users will eventually have multiple security services among which to choose section 5.1 validation system the chain link validation system monitors on-chain oracle behavior providing an objective performance metric that can guide user selection of oracles it will seek to monitor oracles for availability the validation system should record failures by an oracle to respond in a timely way to queries it will compile ongoing uptime statistics correctness the validation system should record apparent arrenuous responses by an oracle as measured by deviations from responses provided by peers in our initial on-chain aggregation system in chain-link such monitoring is straightforward as all oracle activity is visible to link dash sc recall however that in the off chain aggregation system envisaged for chain link its the oracles themselves that perform aggregation consequently chain link dash sc does not have direct visibility into oracle responses and cannot itself monitor availability and correctness fortunately oracles digitally sign their responses and thus as a side effect generate non-reputable evidence of their answers our proposed approach will therefore be to realize the validation service as a smart contract that would reward oracles for submitting evidence of deviating responses in other words oracles would be incentivized to report apparently irrenulus behavior availability is somewhat trickier to monitor as oracles of course dont sign their failures to respond instead a proposed protocol enhancement would require oracles to digitally sign attestations to the set of responses they have received from other oracles the validation contract would then accept and again reward submission of attestations that demonstrate consistent non-responsiveness by an underperforming oracle to its peers in both the on-chain and off-chain cases availability and correctness statistics for oracles will be visible on chain users developers will thus be able to view them in real time through an appropriate front-end such as adap in ethereum or an equivalent application for a permissioned blockchain section 5.2 reputation system the reputation system proposed for chain link would record and publish user ratings of oracle providers and nodes offering a means for users to evaluate oracle performance holistically validator system reports are likely to be a major factor in determining oracle reputations and placing these reputations on a firm footing of trust factors beyond on-chain history though can provide essential information about oracle node security profiles these may include users familiarity with oracles brands operating entities and architectures we envision the chain link reputation system to include a basic on-chain component where users ratings would be available for other smart contracts to reference additionally reputation metrics should be easily accessible off chain where larger amounts of data can be efficiently processed and more flexibly weighted for a given oracle operator the reputation system is initially proposed as supporting the following metrics both at the granularity of specific assignment types see section 2 and also in general for all types supported by a node item 1 in this list is total number of assigned requests the total number of past requests that an oracle has agreed to both fulfilled and unfulfilled item two is total number of completed requests the total number of past requests that an oracle has fulfilled this can be averaged over number of requests assigned to calculate completion rate item 3 is total number of accepted requests the total number of requests that have been deemed acceptable by calculating contracts when compared with peer responses this can be averaged over total assigned or total completed requests to get insight into accuracy rates item four is average time to respond while it may be necessary to give oracle responses time for confirmation the timeliness of their responses will be helpful in determining future timeliness average response time is calculated based on completed requests and item five is amount of penalty payments if penalty payments were locked in to assure a node operators performance the result would be a financial metric of an oracle providers commitment not to engage in an exit scam attack where the provider takes users money and doesnt provide services this metric would involve both a temporal and a financial dimension high reputation services are strongly incentivized in any market to behave correctly and ensure high availability and performance negative user feedback will pose a significant risk to brand value as do the penalties associated with misbehavior consequently we anticipate a virtuous circle in which well-functioning oracles develop good reputations and good reputations give rise to incentives for continued high performance section 5.3 certification service while our validation and reputation systems are intended to address a broad range of faulty behaviors by oracles and is proposed as a way to ensure system integrity in the vast majority of cases chain link may also include an additional mechanism called a certification service its goal is to prevent and or remediate rare but catastrophic events especially in block cheating in the form of sybil and mirroring attacks which we now explain sybil and mirrorine attacks both are simple and in-contract aggregation protocols seek to prevent free loading in the sense of dishonest nodes copying honestnodes answers but neither protects against civil attacks such attacks involve an adversary that controls multiple ostensibly independent oracles this adversary can attempt to dominate the oracle pool causing more than lowercase f oracles to participate in the aggregation protocol and provide false data at strategic times eg in order to influence large transactions in high-value contracts quorums of cheating oracles can also arise not just under the control of a single adversary but also through collusion among multiple adversaries attacks or faults involving greater than lowercase f oracles are especially pernicious in that they are undetectable from on-chain behavior alone additionally to reduce operational costs a sybil attacker can adopt a behavior called mirroring in which it causes oracles to send individual responses based on data obtained from a single data source query in other words misbehaving oracles may share data off chain but pretend to source data independently mirroring benefits an adversary whether or not it chooses to send false data it poses a much less serious security threat than data falsification but does slightly degrade security in that it eliminates the error correction resulting from diversified queries against a given source source for example if colon forward slash forward slash emits irrenuous data due to say a sporadically triggered bug multiple queriers may still obtain a correct majority result sybil attacks resulting in false data mirroring and collusion in general may be eliminated by the use of trusted hardware in our long-term strategy see section 6. certification service design the chain link certification service would seek to provide general integrity and availability assurance detecting and helping prevent mirroring and colluding oracle quorums in the short to medium term the certification service would issue endorsements of high quality oracle providers we emphasize again as noted above that the service will only rate providers for the benefit of users it is not meant to dictate oracle node participation or non-participation in the system the certification service supports endorsements based on several features of oracle deployment and behavior it would monitor the validation system statistics on oracles and perform post-hoc spot checking of on-chain answers particularly for high-value transactions comparing them with answers obtained directly from reputable data sources with sufficient demand for an oracle providers data we expect there to be enough economic incentive to justify off-chain audits of oracle providers confirming compliance with relevant security standards such as relevant controls in the cloud security alliance csa cloud controls matrix as well as providing useful security information that they conduct proper audits of oracles source and bytecode for their smart contracts in addition to the reputation metrics automated on-chain and automated off-chain systems for fraud detection the certification service is planned as a means to identify sybil attacks and other malfunctions that automated on-chain systems cannot for example if all nodes agree that the moon is made of green cheese they can cause user-sc to ingest this false fact moon components equals open curly brackets green cheese closed curly brackets will be recorded on the blockchain however and visible in a post-hoc review ️ She White Papers presents female audio narration of Chainlink LINK Audio White Paper Part 3 of 5. “Chainlink is a decentralized oracle network consisting of purchasers and providers of data. ️ Purchasers request data and providers return data in a secure way.” Description pulled from decrypt.co Crypto whitepapers are essential research that every cryptocurrency trader should be reading. But that’s easier said than done. Audio white paper narration makes this easier by allowing individuals to listen to a white paper while multitasking. ️ $he Crypto White Papers does not claim that this audio white paper is read with 100% accuracy but I do try my best. It is meant for educational and entertainment purposes only. This is not financial advice. Are you a crypto super fan? We have some nifty crypto merchandise on our website! If youd like to tip, please use the wallet addresses below: BTC: bc1q2wa6ukvhz548mvt5pl3g5sa9y8krys4pzz2hln ETH & BAT: 0xd051B281FAD91CDeEC79F718493F1bDD5a1CcDA6 Thank you! What white paper project should we narrate next? Tell us in the comments below LASVEGAS,
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